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REINTERPRETING THE APPARENT FAILURE OF THE
PRESIDENTIAL RECORDS ACT AND THE
NECESSITY OF EXECUTIVE ORDER 13,233: DENYING
HISTORIANS ACCESS OR PROTECTING THE PRA?
Erik Paul Khoobyarian*

I.

INTRODUCTION

Presidents since George Washington have sought to protect
certain information from the hands of Congress and others.'
Executive privilege exists as a powerful tool, used by the
President to guard such information. The import of executive
privilege has manifested itself in a variety of ways resulting in2
questions of separation of powers and presidential immunity.
The Constitution of the United States is silent on many of these
issues. 3 More importantly, Congress historically maintained its
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1. This struggle is not the focus of this comment. It is important, however, to
recognize that there is historical context to the concept that certain deliberations
should be conducted in a candid fashion in order to reach results which could
otherwise not be reached without confidential proceedings. See United States v.
Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 706 (1964) ("[tihe President's need for complete candor and
objectivity from advisors calls for great deference from the courts .... "). This is not
to say that this fact alone is sufficient to warrant that presidential secrets should all
be preserved. See generally Dorsen and Shattuck, Executive Privilege, the Congress and
the Courts, 35 OHIO ST. L.J. 1, 23 (1974) (providing background and history on the
use of executive privilege).
2. See id.
3. See Dorsen and Shattuck, supra note 1 (explaining that the concept of
separation of powers has evolved from the original structure of the Constitution
and the intent of the Framers; executive privilege has been borne out of this
concept). See also Hearing on the Implementation and Effectiveness of the Presidential
Records Act of 1978 Before the Subconn. on Gov't Efficiency, Fin. Mgmt., and
Intergovernmental Relations, of the Comm. on Gov't Reform, 107th Cong. 40-62, at 42
(2002) [hereinafter Hearings] (prepared statement of Mark J. Rozell, Professor of
Politics, Catholic University of America) ("Executive privilege is an implied power
derived from Article II. It is most easily defined as the right of the President and
high-level Executive branch officers to withhold information from those who have
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power by refusing to buttress Executive claims of immunity
from congressional interference. 4 Ultimately, the Supreme Court
stepped forward and gave the President the power to invoke the
executive privilege.5
However, this decision raised new
concerns as to whether the judiciary was empowered to make
such a decision and from where that power originated.6 The
separation of powers inherent in the Constitution has produced
a body of constitutional law that makes it difficult for the
layman to understand what information the President can and
cannot keep from congressional reach under the executive
privilege. 7 Consequently, the duration and scope of the
executive privilege sets the stage for this comment's focus on the
release of presidential records. 8
In response to pending litigation 9 and Executive Order
13,23310 of November 1, 2001, this comment addresses the

current status of the Presidential Records Act (PRA)". Part II of
this comment first presents the history of presidential
documents resulting in the passage of the Presidential Records
Act in 1978.12 Next, it outlines the PRA and its effect on the
dissemination of presidential records.1 3 This section also
discusses Executive Order 12,66714 (Reagan Order) issued at the
close of President Ronald Reagan's term, which outlined the
implementation of the PRA. 15
Further, it addresses
compulsory power-Congress and the courts (and therefore, ultimately the
public).").
4. See Dorsen and Shattuck, supra note 1.
5. See id.
6. See id.
7. See generally Hearings, supra note 3 (prepared statement of Mark J. Rozell,
Professor of Politics, Catholic University of America).
8. See infra Part II.D. In response to Executive Order 13,233, the American
Historical Association, Hugh Davis Graham, Stanley I. Kutler, the Organization of
American Historians, the National Security Archive, Public Citizen, Inc., and the
Reporters Committee for Freedom of the Press filed a lawsuit against John W.
Carlin, Archivist of the United States in the United States District Court for the
District of Columbia in a complaint dated November 28, 2001. See infra note 130
and accompanying text. See also supra note 3.
9. See supra note 8.
10. Exec. Order No. 13,233, 3 C.F.R. 815 (2002), reprinted in 44 U.S.C.A. § 2204
(West 2002) [hereinafter Bush Order].
11. 44 U.S.C. §§ 2201-2207 (1994).
12. See infra Part II.
13. See infra Part II.A.
14. Exec. Order No. 12,667, 54 Fed. Reg. 3403, 1998 U.S.C.C.A.N. B95 (Jan. 16,
1989) [hereinafter Reagan Order].
15. See infra Part lI.B.
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interpretation of the PRA under Executive Order 13,23316 (Bush
18
Order) 17 and subsequent opposition to the Executive Order.
Part III of this comment presents the legal problem with the
PRA, resulting from the interpretations and implementations of
the Reagan and Bush Orders. 9 Part IV of this comment analyzes
the implementation of the PRA from the Reagan Order to the
Bush Order, and the feasibility of appropriate interpretation of
the PRA as Congress drafted it in 1978.20 With the introduction
of legislation in 2002, this section also questions whether
Congress has the legislative power to more thoroughly govern
the President's use of executive privilege. Finally, Part V
proposes that the Bush Order is the best way to implement the
PRA.21
II. BACKGROUND
A.

PresidentialRecords Act (PRA)
1.

Pre-Nixon

Prior to the enactment of the 1978 Presidential Records Act
the President had control of his own documents both
before and after his presidency. 23 This rule enabled the
President to take all records of deliberations that took place
while in office, presumably to the grave. 24 The PRA limited
access to these documents by people other than the President's
designees to situations involving subpoenas for legitimate courtapproved reasons. Eventual release was at the discretion of the
25
President.
Under the PRA, several Presidents released some of their
materials that were then held by the presidential libraries. 26 The
presidential libraries maintain the materials of former Presidents
(PRA),22

16. Bush Order, supra note 10.
17. See infra Part II.C.

18. See infra Part II.D.
19. See infra Part III.
20. See infra Part IV.

21. See infra Part V.
22. Pub. L. No. 95-591, 92 Stat. 2523 (codified at 44 U.S.C. §§ 2201-2207 (1994)).
23. See supra note 1.
24. See supra note 1.
25. See supra note 1.
26. See Hearings, supra note 3, at 11-22 (prepared statement of John W. Carlin,
Archivist of the United States).
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Hoover, Roosevelt, Truman, Eisenhower, Kennedy, Johnson,
Ford, and Carter. 27 These libraries operate according to the
terms of the deeds of gift drafted by the former Presidents when
28
they donated their materials to the National Archives.
The former Presidents deeded their respective materials to
the National Archives with certain provisions. 29 According to
John W. Carlin, Archivist of the United States, "[e]ach of these
deeds has provisions outlining categories of records that may be
withheld from public access for some period of time." 30 These
provisions are intended to prevent disclosure of information that
could "harm national security, invade personal privacy, or cause
31
embarrassment or harassment."
Prior to the PRA, the director of each Presidential Library
maintained the materials of the former Presidents. 32 The
National Archives and Records Administration (NARA), in
consultation with the former President, appointed these
directors.3 3 According to Carlin, "[1]iving former Presidents in
some cases would establish priorities for the processing of
particular subjects or series of records." 34 Other than these
priorities for processing of documents established by the
Presidents before providing them to NARA, once released to
35
NARA, the former President gave up control of the documents.
Furthermore, most former Presidents released the vast majority
of their documents, thereby subjecting them to the scrutiny of
36
the general public.
Typically, the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) governs
the release of government documents. 37 The FOIA sets a
timetable for the release of government documents at the
request of the public as well as requirements for the reporting of
statistics relating to rates of request and the number of requests

27. See id. at 14.
28. See id.

29. See id.
30. Id.
31. Id.
32. See Hearings, supra note 3, at 14-15 (prepared statement of John W. Carlin,
Archivist of the United States).

33. See id. at 14.
34. Id.
35. See id. at 14-15.

36. See Hearings, supra note 3, at 20-21 (testimony of M. Edward Whelan, Il,
Acting Assistant Attorney General, Office of Legal Counsel, Dept. of Justice).

37. 5 U.S.C. § 552 (1988).
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that are honored. 38 Presidential documents deeded to NARA are
not subject to the same disclosure requirements as the FOIA,
because they are not deemed government documents, but rather
considered collectively as a gift to NARA. 39 As a result of the
exemption from the FOIA, directors' collection of documents at
presidential libraries is much quicker than typical FOIA
requests. 40 However, historians and researchers have no legal
recourse for materials that are not released. 41 They would have
these rights under the FOIA.42
The concept of exempting presidential documents from the
FOIA was essential to the Act, as passage of the FOIA was
contingent upon it.43 The FOIA was never intended to cover
presidential documents. 44 In fact, it was not until the Watergate
scandal that questions regarding presidential immunity and
executive privilege came to the forefront of discussions of
45
preservation of documents.
2.

PresidentNixon and the PresidentialRecordings and
Materials PreservationAct (PRMPA)

In order to ensure government control of the Nixon papers
and tapes, Congress passed the Presidential Recordings and
Materials Preservation Act (PRMPA)46 in 1974. 47 The PRMPA
effectively opened the door to the question as to when the
federal government would take ownership of presidential
documents. 48 Federal ownership of presidential documents
would result in their inclusion under FOIA, meaning denied
requests for documents by individuals would be open to judicial
review. 49 Although the PRMPA was specifically geared towards
the Watergate materials, it resulted in the formation of
38. See id.
39. See Hearings, supra note 3, at 15 (prepared statement of John W. Carlin,
Archivist of the United States).
40. See id.
41. See id.
42. See id.
43. See id.
44. See id.
45. See Hearings, supra note 3, at 15-16 (prepared statement of John W. Carlin,
Archivist of the United States).
46. 44 U.S.C. § 2111 (1974).
47. See Hearings, supra note 3, at 15-16 (prepared statement of John W. Carlin,
Archivist of the United States).
48. See id. at 15.
49. See id.
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committees that ultimately resulted in the drafting of the PRA in
1978, four years after passage of the PRMPA.50
The PRMPA established the National Study Commission on
Records and Documents of Federal Officials. 5' The PRMPA
charged the commission with studying "whether the historical
practice regarding the records and documents produced by or
on behalf of Presidents of the United States should be rejected or
accepted and whether such practice should be made applicable
with respect to all federal officials." 52 The commission produced
its 1977 report, which Congress used during the formation of the
PRA.53
3. PRA Enactment
The Presidential Records Act, passed in 1978, directs the
Archivist of the United States to administer presidential records
as they would FOIA requests.5 4 There are several exceptions to
the FOIA distributions related to the timeframe for the release of
documents.5 5 Presidential records are not released during the
President's term of office, and are only released under the
authorization of the incumbent President after five years have
elapsed.5 6 Furthermore, under the PRA a President may restrict
access for up to twelve years to any of his records that fall within
six specified categories.5 7 These six categories, roughly distilled,
include: national defense, appointments to federal office,
statutorily exempted materials, 5 8 trade secrets, confidential
communications, 59 and personnel and medical files. 60
50. See id. at 15-16.
51. See id. at 15.
52. Id. at 15 (citing Pub. L. No. 93-526, 88 Stat. 1695).
53. See Hearings, supra note 3, at 15 (prepared statement of John W. Carlin,
Archivist of the United States).
54. 44 U.S.C. § 2204(c).
55. See id. § 2204(a). Typically records requested under the FOIA are
immediately available to the public. See id.
56. See Hearings, supra note 3, at 16 (prepared statement of John W. Carlin,
Archivist of the United States).
57. See Hearings, supra note 3, at 65-77 (prepared statement of Peter M. Shane,
professor, University of Pittsburgh and Carnegie Mellon University).
58. 44 U.S.C. § 2204(a)(3) ("[Sipecifically exempted from disclosure by
statute... provided that such statute requires the material to be withheld from the
public in such a manner as to leave no discretion on the issue, or... establishes
particular criteria for withholding or refers to particular types of material to be
withheld.").
59. See id. § 2204(a)(5) (explaining that such communications are those
"between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors").
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"This structure... leaves certain important questions
unanswered. Those questions exist in part because, in providing
for a staged release of records from past Presidents, the Act is
also explicit in leaving untouched 'any constitutionally-based
privilege which [sic] may be available to an incumbent or former
President.' ' 61 Such privileges must be identified before the
President leaves office and they are not subject to judicial
62
review.
The Archivist of the United States is responsible for "the
custody, control, and preservation of, and access to, the
63 Under the
Presidential records of th[e former] President."
PRA, the NARA has taken control of the presidential records of
Presidents Ronald Reagan, George H.W. Bush, and William J.
Clinton.64 The PRA mandates that the Archivist must "make
[the presidential] records available to the public as rapidly and
completely as possible consistent with the provisions of the
65
Act."
The House report accompanying the PRA states:
The legislation would terminate the tradition of private
ownership of Presidential papers and the reliance on
volunteerism to determine the fate of their disposition.
Instead, the preservation of the historical record of future
Presidencies would be assured and public access to the
materials would be consistent under standards fixed in law.
The primary function of the Presidential libraries remains
unchanged. The libraries are to continue to provide
information about their holdings and to make records
66
available to researchers upon request on an impartial basis.
Under the PRA all the presidential records of an administration
are transferred "to the legal and physical custody of [NARA]
immediately upon the end of the President's last term of
office." 67 The PRA is a significant change from the treatment of
60. See id. § 2204(a)(6).
61. Hearings,supra note 3, at 67.
62. See Hearings, supra note 3, at 16 (prepared statement of John W. Carlin,
Archivist of the United States).
63. 44 U.S.C. § 2203(0(1).
64. See Hearings, supra note 3, at 12 (prepared statement of John W. Carlin,
Archivist of the United States).
65. 44 U.S.C. § 2203(f)(1).
66. H.R. REP. No. 95-1487, at 2-3 (1978), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5732,
5732.
67. Hearings, supra note 3, at 12 (prepared statement of John W. Carlin,
Archivist of the United States).
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Presidential documents for the 200 years, and represents a

codification of the practice of Presidents who voluntarily handed

their documents over to the federal government through their
libraries.68 The House Report on the PRA states that "[i]t is
anticipated that the Archivist will process the former
administration's papers in a manner roughly similar to current
69
practices."
The PRA gives some degree of flexibility in its application to
the Archivist and the NARA.70 The President also may waive
certain restrictions or shorten the length of restricted access. 71
The Archivist's freedom to negotiate with the former President
is important to ensure that the former President's interests are
considered regarding the distribution of documents.72 The PRA
does not take away the President's power to exercise executive
privilege after he leaves office. 73 Had the PRA taken that power
away, it would have been preempted by the Supreme Court. 74
However, the President must decide before leaving office how
he will use the restrictions and for which documents he will
invoke the privilege. 75 The authority for the determination of
what documents are to be released ultimately rests, however, in
the Archivist. 76
Congress intended that the PRA would further allow the
68. See id. See also supra Part II.A.1-2.
69. H.R. REP. No. 95-1487, at 15 (1978), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5732,
5746.
70. See Hearings, supra note 3, at 13-14, 17 (prepared statement of John W.
Carlin, Archivist of the United States).
71. See id. at 16-18.
72. See id. at 13-14.
73. See id. at 17.
74. See Nixon v. Adm'r of Gen. Servs., 433 U.S. 425, 449 (1977) (holding that
constitutionally based privileges available to a President survive the President's
term).
75. See Hearings, supra note 3, at 17-19 (prepared statement of John W. Carlin,
Archivist of the United States). When the President hands his documents over to
the Archivist, the President must designate which records he intends to protect
under the executive privilege. See id. These can be broad categories of documents
and the President will ultimately need to decide, most likely after leaving office,
whether to invoke the privilege with regard to these specific documents. See id.
The President does not need to make this decision when leaving office, and retains
the right to make the decision after they are no longer in office. See id. To do
otherwise would violate the Supreme Court position that the privilege survives the
President's term. See id.; Adm'r of Gen. Servs., 433 U.S. at 449.
76. See Hearings, supra note 3,at 16-19 (prepared statement of John W. Carlin,
Archivist of the United States) (with the exception relating to Presidential
restrictions that preserves the President's ability to prevent certain documents from
being released by the Archivist).
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Archivist to control the documents in a manner consistent with
previous practice. 77 The rights of the former President are held
by the incumbent President in that the incumbent President may
exercise the executive privilege to block the release of certain
documents. 78 The PRA states that "[n]othing in this Act shall be
construed to confirm, limit, or expand any constitutionallybased privilege which may be available to an incumbent or
former President." 79
Like much legislation, the PRA gives the President the
responsibility to interpret and implement the law.8 0 Although
81
the guidelines for implementation are found in the statute, the
PRA never spelled out the interplay between 2 the incumbent
President, the former President, and the NARA.8
Executive Order 12,667 (Reagan Order)
Two days before leaving office in 1989, President Ronald
Reagan issued Executive Order 12,66783 entitled the
"Presidential Records" order (Reagan Order). The introduction
to the Reagan Order states that it was enacted "in order to
establish policies and procedures governing the assertion of
executive privilege by incumbent and former Presidents in
connection with the release of Presidential records by [NARA]
4
pursuant to the [PRA] of 1978."8
The Reagan Order establishes a method for the release of
B.

77. See id. at 17.
Moreover, in the legislative history, Congress anticipated that the
Archivist [would negotiate the Presidential restrictions with the former
President]: "It is also expected that the Archivist will follow past practice
in applying the restrictive categories to former Presidents' deeds of gift,
and negotiate with the ex-President or his representative on an on-going
basis to lessen the number of years chosen for particular mandatory
restriction categories, to eliminate entire categories, or to permit release of
particular records otherwise restricted."
Id. (quoting H.R. REP. No. 95-1487, at 15 (1978), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5732,
5746).
78. See Hearings, supra note 3, at 18 (prepared statement of John W. Carlin,
Archivist of the United States).
79. 44 U.S.C. § 2204(c)(2).
80. See generally Hearings, supra note 3 (prepared statement of John W. Carlin,
Archivist of the United States).
81. 44 U.S.C. §§ 2201-2207 (2001).
82. See generally Hearings, supra note 3 (prepared statement of John W. Carlin,
Archivist of the United States) (specifically, the role of the directors of the
Presidential libraries and the Archives Director are not included in the PRA).
83. Reagan Order, supra note 14.
84. Id.
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Presidential records covered under the PRA.85 Significantly,
President Reagan was the first President whose records were
subject to the PRA.86 More than nine years after passage of the
PRA, and on the eve of its implementation, the Reagan Order
was enacted, outlining how requests under the PRA would fit
into NARA's information dissemination process. 87
The Reagan Order requires the Archivist to notify the
incumbent President and the former President when he receives
notification of a request that may raise a question of executive
privilege. 88 The Reagan Order instructs the Archivist to use his
discretion, requiring him to identify materials which "he
believes may raise a substantial question of Executive
privilege."89
However, if the Archivist does not identify
documents as being potentially protected under executive
privilege, the incumbent and former Presidents retain their
respective right to exercise executive privilege for appropriate
subject matter. 90 The former President and the incumbent
President then have thirty days to invoke executive privilege
before the Archivist is directed to release the documents.91
1.

Claim of Executive Privilege by Incumbent President

The Reagan Order directs the Attorney General and the
incumbent President to coordinate with other Federal Agencies
to determine whether "invocation of Executive privilege is
justified." 92 The Attorney General and the Counsel to the
President may determine that it is not appropriate to invoke
executive privilege, in which case they must notify the Archivist
"promptly ... of any such determination."93 If after consultation
with the Attorney General and the Counsel to the President, the
incumbent President decides to invoke executive privilege with
regard to the records, the former President and the Archivist are
notified. 94 The "Archivist shall not disclose the privileged

85. See id.
86. See Hearings,supra note 3, at 32-36 (prepared statement of Anna K. Nelson,
Distinguished Adjunct Historian in Residence, American University).
87. See id. at 33.
88. Reagan Order, supra note 14.
89. Id.
90. See id.
91. See id.
92. Id. § 3(a).
93. Id. § 3(b).
94. See Reagan Order, supra note 14.
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records unless directed to do so by an incumbent President or by
95
a final court order."
Claim of Executive Privilege by Former President
When a former President claims executive privilege, the
Archivist consults with the Attorney General and other Federal
agencies to determine whether to disclose the records, or to
96
honor the former President's claim of privilege. The Archivist
makes his determination regarding the disclosure of the
President's
incumbent
the
to
according
documents
97 Once the Archivist makes his determination, he
instructions.
notifies the incumbent President 98and the former President that
the documents are to be released.
2.

Executive Order 13,233 (Bush Order)
January 18, 2001, marked twelve years since President
Reagan left office. This twelve-year point was significant
because, even under the Reagan Order, the incumbent President
had only thirty days to invoke executive privilege with regard to
99
any of former President Reagan's records. The Reagan Order
specified that the incumbent President must notify the Archivist
"in writing of the claim of privilege and the specific Presidential
100 President George W. Bush received
records to which it relates."
several requests for roughly 68,000 pages of documents that had
been withheld for the twelve years since the end of the last
Reagan term. 1°1 Although the PRA had been signed into law
more than twenty years earlier, these records would be the first
10 2
Furthermore, these requests
released under its mandate.
C.

95. Id. § 3(d).
96. See id. § 4(a).
97. See id. § 4(b).
98. See id.
99. See 44 U.S.C. § 2204. See also Reagan Order, supra note 14, § 3(c). President
Reagan left office in January 1989. He was first elected President in 1980 and took
office in 1981, serving two four-year terms. See The Reagan Presidency at
http://www.reagan.utexas.edu/ref/rrpres.htm (last visited April 1, 2003).
100. Reagan Order, supra note 14, § 3(d) (emphasis added).
101. See Hearings,supra note 3, at 447 (prepared statement of Morton Rosenberg,
specialist in American public law, American Law Division, Congressional Research
Service).
102. See id. at 446-48. It is important to note, however, that the governmentownership of documents became ordinary under the FOIA and that release of
records to the public had been taking place for some time. Furthermore, the Nixon
records were both the motivation and the model for further release of Presidential
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would be the first time that privileged documents would be
released-setting a precedent for further release of Presidential
records under the PRA.103
On November 1, 2001, President George W. Bush issued
Executive Order 13,233 titled "Further Implementation of the
Presidential Records Act." 104 The Bush Order modified the
practice under the Reagan Order and ultimately revoked
Executive Order 12,667 (the Reagan Order). 05
1.

Constitutionaland Legal Backgroundfor the Bush Order
Prior to leaving office, the former President and the
incumbent President have the ability to limit access to records. 106
These limits last for twelve years under the PRA.107 After that
period, the PRA requires the Archivist to use the FOIA as the
guide for administering Presidential records.108
"Section
2204(c)(2) recognizes that the former President or the incumbent
President may assert any constitutionally based privileges,
including those ordinarily encompassed within exemption (b)(5)
of section 552."109
According to the Bush Order, the Executive exercise of
constitutionally-based privilege cannot cease solely due to the
passage of time, without regard to the incumbent President's
ability to discern the timeliness of the release of records. 1 0 The
Bush Order relies upon the Supreme Court holding in Nixon v.
Administrator of General Services"' that "[ujnless [the President]
can give his advisors some assurance of confidentiality, a
President could not expect to receive the full and frank
submissions of facts and opinions upon which effective
discharge of his duties depends."" 2

records. See id.
103. See Hearings, supra note 3, at 34 (prepared statement of Anna K. Nelson,
Distinguished Adjunct Historian in Residence, American University).
104. Bush Order, supra note 10.
105. See id. § 13.
106. See supra notes 53-63 and accompanying text.
107. 44 U.S.C. § 2204.
108. See Bush Order, supra note 10, § 2 (quoting 44 U.S.C. § 2204).
109. Id. (referring to the PRA which limits the use of exemptions under the
FOIA, noting also that even with the exemption, the President retains their
privileges after they leave office).
110. See id.
111. 433 U.S. 425 (1977).
112. Bush Order, supra note 10, § 2 (quoting 433 U.S. at 448-49) (internal
quotations omitted).
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The Bush Order also relies on the Supreme Court ruling in
United States v. Nixon,113 which "held that a party seeking to
overcome the constitutionally based privileges that apply to
Presidential records must establish at least a 'demonstrated,
specific need' for particular records, a standard that turns on the
nature of the proceedings and the importance of the information
to that proceeding." 114 Additionally, the Bush Order notes that
although Presidents have had this ability to exercise executive
privilege, they have still historically chosen to release their
records in due time. 115 Although Presidents have frequently
of
exercised the privilege in the past, after "appropriate period[s]
116
access."
authorize
to
"decided
ultimately
have
most
repose"
Procedurefor Administering Privileged PresidentialRecords
Under the Bush Order
The Bush Order profoundly changes the procedures for
records, 117 while
presidential
privileged
administering
maintaining several steps from the Reagan Order. 118 After the
Archivist receives the request for access to Presidential records,
the Archivist notifies the former President and the incumbent
President.1 19 The Archivist provides both Presidents with the
requested records, 120 and he may not release the records while
1 21
the former President reviews them.
The incumbent President concurrently has the ability to
determine whether to invoke executive privilege with regard to
If the former President has requested
the records. 122
withholding of the records and "the incumbent President
concurs in the former President's decision to request
withholding of records as privileged, the incumbent President
123 The
shall inform the former President and the Archivist."
Archivist may not permit access to the records until the
2.

113. 418 U.S. 683 (1974).
114. Bush Order, supra note 10, § 2 (quoting 418 U.S. at 713).
115. See id. § 2(c).
116. Id.

117. See id. § 3.
118. Compare id. with Reagan Order, supra note 14, § 3(d).
119. See id.
120. See Bush Order, supra note 10, § 3(a).
121. See id. § 3(b) ("The Archivist shall not permit access to the records by a
requester during this period of review or when requested by the former President
to extend the time of review.").
122. See id. § 3(d).

123. Id. § 3(d)(1)(i).

SANTA CLARA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 43

incumbent President informs them that both he and the former
President agree to authorize access "or until so ordered by a
124
final and nonappealable court order."
The Bush Order uses section 2204(c)(2) of title 44 to invoke
the executive privilege that exists outside of the PRA.125 By
invoking the Supreme Court guarantee of Presidential privilege
beyond the term of office, the Bush Order effectively enables
Presidents to block the release of records indefinitely. 126 The
Bush Order has caused significant discussion because the
current requests for the Reagan records are the first under the
PRA and thus will set precedent for the release of future
27
presidential records.
D.

Opposition to The Bush Order
When the Bush Order was released to the press on
November 1, 2001, they immediately questioned the President's
motive and the effect that the Bush Order would have on the
PRA. 28 Less than one month after the Bush Order was released,
several groups and individuals filed a complaint (Complaint) in
the United States District Court for the District of Columbia. 129
The plaintiffs in the case ranged from history professors 130 to
124. Id.
125. See supra notes 110-116 and accompanying text.
126. See Reagan Order, supra note 14, § 2(a). See also supra notes 110-116 and
accompanying text. This section draws a connection to the Supreme Court support
of constitutionally-based privileges which supercede the limitations placed on the
privilege by legislation like the PRA. See Reagan Order, supra note 14, § 2(a).
127. See Hearings, supra note 3, at 34 (prepared statement of Anna K. Nelson,
Distinguished Adjunct Historian in Residence, American University).

128. See infra Part IV and supra note 8. See generally Stephen L. Hensen, The
President's Papers Are the People's Business, THE WASH. POST, Dec. 16, 2001, at B01
(The Bush Order "directly subverts the intent of the [PRA] by placing ultimate
responsibility for decisions regarding access to presidential papers ... with any
sitting president in the future... apparently without limit."); Robert Dallek, All the
Presidents' Words Hushed, THE L.A. TIMES, Nov. 25, 2001, at MI ("the principal
victim of Bush's directive will be himself and the country"). But cf. Press Briefing

by Ari Fleischer, Office of the Press Secretary, The White House (Nov. 1, 2001),
available at http:/ /www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2001/11/20011101-4.html
("[Presidential records] will be available through a much more orderly process. The
Executive order will lay out the terms of that process, and it will help people to get

information.").
129. See supra note 8.
130. See Complaint at paras. 4-5, Amer. Historical Ass'n v. Nat'l Archives and
Records
Admin.
(D.D.C. 2001)
(No.
1:01 CV02447),
available at
http://www.rcfp.org/news/documents/20011128ahavnara.pdf (Nov. 28, 2001)
[hereinafter Complaint].
Plaintiff Hugh Davis Graham holds appointments as the Holland N.
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nonprofit research organizations 31 to a non-governmental
132
research institute.
The Complaint sought declaratory, injunctive and
mandamus relief. 33 The principle claim was that the NARA
34
must administer the PRA without regard to the Bush Order.
The plaintiffs wanted the court to "compel the release of the
presidential materials of former President Ronald Reagan that
are in the custody of NARA and are being withheld in violation
of the PRA." 135 In their outline of the PRA, the plaintiffs stated

that "[a]fter expiration of the 12-year restriction period, formerly
restricted materials become available to the public through FOIA
to the same extent as materials that were not restricted by the
former president." 136
Plaintiffs further claimed that once the twelve year
restriction period ends, the right to executive privilege is no
longer available due to the PRA removal of the FOIA's
exemption five. 137 The Complaint further delineated that "a
president may prevent disclosure of records that reflect
confidential communications with or among his advisors for no
more than 12 years."

38

After these twelve years pass, the

materials should not be withheld and must be released to the
39
public unless they fall under another FOIA exemption.
The Reagan documents were the first to be made available
under the PRA, and over the past twelve years approximately
four million pages of documents have been released. 40 Plaintiffs
McTyeire Professor of History and as Professor of Political Science at
Vanderbilt University, as well as a three-year appointment as Adjunct
Professor of History at the University of California at Santa Barbara...
Plaintiff Stanley I. Kutler is Professor Emeritus of History and Law at the
University of Wisconsin.
Id.
131. See id. at paras. 3, 7-9. Plaintiffs American Historical Association,
Organization of American Historians, Public Citizen, Inc., and the Reporters
Committee for Freedom of the Press are all nonprofit organizations. See id.
132. See id. at para. 6 ("Plaintiff National Security Archive is an independent
non-governmental research institute and library located at The George Washington
University in Washington, D.C.").
133. See id. at para. 1.
134. See id.
135. Id.
136. Complaint, supra note 130, at para. 16.
137. See 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(5).
138. Complaint, supra note 130, at para. 17.
139. See id. at para. 17.
140. See id. at para. 28.
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estimate in the Complaint that the Reagan records obtained by
1 41
the NARA are around forty-four million pages of documents.
The instant concern is the documents restricted under the PRA
by President Reagan. 142 The records total approximately 68,000
pages of documents restricted because President Reagan
143
invoked the "confidential communications" privilege.
Historians documenting the Reagan presidency have requested
access to these documents. 144
The NARA provided notice in February 2001, that requests
for the 68,000 pages previously restricted by President Reagan
would be honored because there was no "substantial question of
145
Executive privilege" within the meaning of the Reagan Order.
The NARA intended to distribute the documents on a schedule
prescribed by the Archivist to the White House. 146 The White
House Counsel sent letters to the Archivist requesting
147
extensions for review of the documents.
President Bush issued the Bush Order in response to these
requests, and the Complaint charged that this change in
procedure is not in line with the PRA. 14 The Complaint alleged

141. See id. at para. 25.
142. See id. at para. 31.
143. See id.
144. See Complaint, supra note 130, at para. 29 ("Members of plaintiff AHA were
among those who requested access to Reagan presidential records, and who did not
receive access to restricted records.").
145. See id. at para. 33 (quoting Reagan Order, supra note 14, § 2(a)).
When the Archivist provides notice to the incumbent and former
Presidents of his intent to disclose Presidential records pursuant to section
1270.46 of the NARA regulations, the Archivist, utilizing any guidelines
provided by the incumbent and former Presidents, shall identify any
specific materials, the disclosure of which he believes may raise a
substantialquestion of Executive privilege.
Reagan Order, supra note 14, § 2(a) (emphasis added). Whether or not the materials
raise "a substantial question" is left to the sole discretion of the Archivist with the
caveat that the incumbent or former President may "invoke Executive privilege
with respect to materials not identified by the Archivist." Id.
146. See id. at para. 35.
147. See id. at para. 36.
According to defendant Carlin ... rather than reviewing whether there
was a basis for objecting to the release of particular documents that was
consistent with the terms of the PRA, the White House was instead
"conduct[ing] a thorough legal review of the PRA and consider[ing] its
long-term implications on the deliberative process for the Presidency and
the Executive Branch."
Id.
148. See id. at paras. 40-41. The Bush Order is "[in contrast to the PRA, which
makes presidential records available after the 12-year restriction period has ended
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that the Bush Order "violates the PRA" on five points. 149
First, it alleged that the Bush Order makes it possible for
materials to be held for an unlimited time, by allowing the
incumbent and former Presidents to review the materials. 150 The
Complaint charged that this violates "the PRA's commands that
records may not be restricted after the 12-year period expires
and that the Archivist has an affirmative duty to make them
1
public as soon as possible." s'
Second, the complaint charged that the Bush Order weakens
the power of the incumbent President by requiring the
incumbent President to concur with the former President about
whether to prevent the release of documents even if there is no
legal claim for the exercise of privilege. 5 2 The Complaint alleges
that the Bush Order requires the incumbent President to concur
with
the
former
President
"absent
'compelling
circumstances,' ... even if the privilege claim is legally improper
15 3
or unfounded."
The third claim against the Bush Order was that the Bush
Order does not allow the Archivist to release the records until
the former President agrees with the release, even if the former
President has invoked the privilege and the incumbent President
has authorized release. 5 4 The only way to effectuate release is
through a binding court order or with the former President's
acquiescence. 55 In either instance, the Archivist is unable to act
without direction from the incumbent President who makes his
156
decision in response to the former President's actions.
The plaintiff's fourth and fifth claims related to who may
invoke the privilege on behalf of a former President. 5 7 The Bush

under FOIA standards." Id.
149. Id. at para. 60.
150. See Complaint, supra note 130, at para. 60(i).
151. Id.
152. See id. at para. 60(ii).
153. Id. (quoting Bush Order, supra note 10, § 4).
154. See id. at para. 60(iii). In this circumstance the incumbent President would
be overruling the invocation of privilege by the former President. However, even
when the incumbent President legally overrules the former President, under the
Bush Order the Archivist is not authorized to release the documents.
155. See id. (referring to Bush Order, supra note 10, § 6).
156. See Complaint, supra note 130, at para. 60(iii). If Complaint charges that the
former President does not take action, the incumbent President does not have to
respond to requests by the Archivist and he can delay release by ignoring the
information from the Archivist. See id.
157. See id. at paras. 60(iv-v).
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Order allows the former President to designate a representative
to act on his behalf with regard to the assertion of executive
privilege. 5 8 Also at issue is the concern as to whether the Vice
President should be able to invoke executive privilege
"independent of the privilege of the former or incumbent
president." 15 9 The Bush Order requires the Archivist to, as
stated in the Complaint, "accord such a claim [of executive
privilege by a Vice President] the same respect as a claim of
privilege made by a former president, even though there is no
160
constitutional basis for a vice presidential executive privilege."'
The demands outlined in the Complaint sought the
immediate release of all of the requested 68,000 pages of
161
documents, claiming that the Bush Order is unconstitutional.
By refusing the release of the records, the Complaint charged
that the NARA violates the PRA and that the Court should
mandate release of the documents satisfying the letter and the
1 62
intent of law.
III. IDENTIFICATION OF THE PROBLEM

When Representative Stephen Horn convened the House of
Representatives Subcommittee that held hearings on the Bush
Order, he stated that he "appreciate[s] the need to preserve
whatever constitutional privileges may still be appropriate for a
former president's records after many years... [h]owever, [he
is] concerned that the new procedures [under the Bush Order]
may create additional delays and barriers to releasing the
Reagan records." 63 Thus, Representative Horn marked the
principal problem with the PRA-the need for excessive
64
executive interpretation for effective implementation.
Congress enacted the PRA more than twenty years before
the Bush Order. The Bush Order relates specifically to FOIA
requests under the FOIA for records owned by the federal
government because of the PRA.165 The PRA attempted to
codify practices that were already taking place as former
158. See Bush Order, supra note 10, § 10. See also Complaint, supra note 130, at
para. 60(iv).
159. Complaint, supra note 130, at para. 60(v).
160. Id.

161. See id. at paras. 65, 73.
162. See id. at para. 75.
163. Hearings, supra note 3, at 4 (opening statement of Rep. Steve Horn).

164. See id. at 3-4.
165. See Bush Order, supra note 10.
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Presidents left office. 166 As a result of Supreme Court precedent
that established a constitutionally-based privilege, the PRA
could not eliminate presidential privilege with regard to
167
confidential documents after the President leaves office.
The PRA thus created a conflict when the procedure of
implementing the Act would determine the breadth and depth
of its scope. 168 The inherent problem is that the PRA leaves the
Executive Branch with the role of interpreting legislation that
169
deals directly with its own interests.
Like all legislation, the drafters never intended that the PRA
would be without need for further interpretation by the
Executive Branch at a later time.1 70 By leaving several issues
unanswered, Congress left room for a balancing-act in the
process of implementing the law.171 However, in this balancing
act, Congress left two elements unaddressed. 172 First, the PRA
provides no administrative procedures for settling disputes
between the Archivist and the incumbent President or former
President. 73 Second, there is no process in the PRA to permit
the incumbent President to "consider whether privilege ought
be asserted to prevent the mandatory withholding of a
174
predecessor's records."

IV. ANALYSIS
A.

Implementation Under the PRA and Changes Arisingfrom the
Bush Order

The PRA does not take away the President's
76
constitutionally-based privileges, 7 5 but rather adds to them.
166. See supra Part II.C (including the granting of gift-deeds to the National
Archives of President's private presidential records).
167. See supra notes 113-116 and accompanying text.
168. See generally Hearings, supra note 3, at 447 (prepared statement of Morton
Rosenberg, specialist in American public law, American Law Division,
Congressional Research Service).
169. See Hearings,supra note 3, at 479-80 (prepared statement of Todd F. Gaziano,
Senior Fellow in Legal Studies and Director, Center for Legal and Judicial Studies at
The Heritage Foundation).
170. See Hearings, supra note 3, at 67-68 (prepared statement of Peter M. Shane,
professor, University of Pittsburgh and Carnegie Mellon University).
171. See id. at 67.
172. See id. at 67-68.
173. See id. at 68.
174. Id.
175. See id. at 67 (stating that if the PRA had purported to do so, it would have
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The intent of the PRA was never to provide all presidential
records to the people, but rather to maintain the records at
NARA with the potential for access to them should the former
President and the incumbent President authorize the release. 177
The Bush Order attempts to fill in gaps left in the PRA. 178
The concern lies in the implementation of the Bush Order with
relation to the speed with which documents are released under
the PRA and the FOIA. 179 Presidential records transferred to
NARA and eventually to the Presidential libraries are then
released under the FOIA schedule. 180 The Bush Order has the
potential to speed up this process, due to its focus on the specific
records that the PRA places in the jurisdiction of the FOIA.181
All other claims not covered under the FOIA are exempt from
the Bush Order and the Archivist retains the ability to
administer the records as he sees fit according to his own
82
regulations.1
The Bush Order may result in speedier release of documents
under the PRA.183 In order for this to occur, there are two
conditions that must be present. 84 First, there must be a large
volume of presidential records that the FOIA would not protect
from mandatory disclosure. 85 Second, the Archivist must be
willing to take the initiative to release documents before a
request has been made.186 In this instance, the Archivist would
make the sole decision as to whether materials present some
substantial question of privilege.187 "In such circumstances, the
been found unconstitutional when subjected to judicial review).
176. See Hearings, supra note 3, at 71 (prepared statement of Peter M. Shane,
professor, University of Pittsburgh and Carnegie Mellon University) ("The PRA
provides only six grounds upon which a former President may restrict access to his
records for up to 12 years. At the same time, the statute holds all constitutionally
based privileges intact.").
177. See id. See also Hearings, supra note 3, at 12-17 (prepared statement of John
W. Carlin, Archivist of the United States).

178. See Hearings, supra note 3, at 70-73 (prepared statement of Peter M. Shane,
professor, University of Pittsburgh and Carnegie Mellon University).
179. See id.
180. See id.
181. See id. See also 44 U.S.C. § 2204(c)(1) (listing the requests that are covered
under the FOIA and thus subject to the Bush Order).

182. See Hearings, supra note 3, at 67-79 (prepared statement of Peter M. Shane,
professor, University of Pittsburgh and Carnegie Mellon University).
183. See id. at 70-71.
184. See id.
185. See id.

186. See id.
187. See Bush Order, supra note 10.
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Bush [O]rder would not contemplate any review by the
incumbent President, and it would appear much easier to
188
achieve the release of presidential records after 12 years."
B.

CongruenceBetween the Bush Order and the Intent of the PRA

The Complaint filed by historians against the NARA, in
response to the implementation of the PRA under the Bush
Order, asserts that the order is not in accordance with the PRA
and should not be followed. 189 However, Congress did not
intend the PRA to allow unlimited access to all presidential
records. 190 Rather, defining the ownership of the documents was
the primary element in the PRA legislation. 19' Thus, records
previously owned by Presidents and then deeded to the
government automatically become the property of the federal

government under the

PRA.192

Where the historians' Complaint has merit is in its claim
that the incumbent President gains some ability to restrict
documents under the Bush Order that the FOIA does not
grant.193 This ability does not create any new rights. Indeed, the
President is merely executing his executive privilege, to which
he is entitled regardless of the Bush Order. 94 The Bush Order
merely codifies the interaction between executive privilege and
195
the PRA.
Although Congress may not have intended the PRA to
allow for incumbent Presidents to block the release of former
Presidents' records indefinitely, 196 the Bush Order applies the
188. Hearings, supra note 3, at 71 (prepared statement of Peter M. Shane,
professor, University of Pittsburgh and Carnegie Mellon University).
189. See Complaint, supra note 130.
190. See Hearings, supra note 3, at 479-80 (prepared statement of Todd F. Gaziano,
Senior Fellow in Legal Studies and Director, Center for Legal and Judicial Studies at
The Heritage Foundation).
191. See id. This can be inferred from the fact that implementation of the PRA is
not included in the act itself. The key was for Presidents to know, upon taking
office, that the records they assembled were not their own property.
Implementation was thus left to the Executive in accordance with the provisions
which the Act did include. See id.
192. See 44 U.S.C. §§ 2201-2207.
193. See Complaint, supra note 130.
194. See Hearings,supra note 3, at 479-81 (prepared statement of Todd F. Gaziano,
Senior Fellow in Legal Studies and Director, Center for Legal and Judicial Studies at
The Heritage Foundation).
195. See id. See also Bush Order, supra note 10.
196. See Hearings,supra note 3, at 33-34 (prepared statement of Anna K. Nelson,
Distinguished Adjunct Historian in Residence, American University).
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PRA in an appropriate manner, considering the powerful right
of presidential privilege. 197 The Complaint fails to recognize that
the PRA does not give the people a right beyond public
ownership of the records. 198 Public access to the records is
governed by the FOIA, which remains subject to executive
privilege. 99 Furthermore, the PRA allows the judiciary to
compel disclosure of specific documents. 200 However, the
Complaint requests complete disclosure of documents and
nullification of the Bush Order.20 1 Such nullification is not
necessary to maintain the PRA.202
C. PresidentialIntent for the Bush Order
Maintaining the constitutionally-based privileges that
Congress never intended to remove from former or incumbent

Presidents via the PRA was vital to implementation of the Act.20 3

Section 2204(c) of the PRA provides that nothing in the Act
"shall be construed to confirm, limit, or expand any
constitutionally-based privilege which may be available to an
incumbent or former President." 204
Congress expressly asserted that both the incumbent and
former Presidents would maintain their rights to these
constitutionally-based privileges to prevent the disclosure of
presidential records which might otherwise be released under
the PRA.205
In fact, when testifying before the House

197. See Bush Order, supra note 10; see also Nixon v. Adm'r of Gen. Servs, 433
U.S. 425.
198. See Hearings, supra note 3, at 11-13 (prepared statement of John W. Carlin,
Archivist of the United States).
199. See id.
200. See id. at 18-19.
201. See Complaint, supra note 130.
202. See Hearings,supra note 3, at 20 (statement of M. Edward Whelan, III, Acting
Assistant Attorney General, Office of Legal Counsel, Dept. of Justice).
This Supreme Court ruling [Nixon v. Administrator of General Services],
together with Congress's express accommodation ruling in section 2204(c)
of the [PRA] entail a need for procedures to govern review of any records
to which such privileges might apply. President Bush's Executive order
establishes clear, sensible and workable procedures that will govern the
decisions by former Presidents and the incumbent President whether to
withhold or release privileged documents.
Id.
203. See id.
204. 44 U.S.C. § 2204(c)(2).
205. See Hearings,supra note 3, at 20 (statement of M. Edward Whelan, 1II, Acting
Assistant Attorney General, Office of Legal Counsel, Dept. of Justice).
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Subcommittee, Acting Assistant Attorney General M. Edward
Whelan, III, explained that the Bush Administration saw the
PRA consistent with these
Bush Order as a way to make the
20 6
constitutionally-based privileges.
The desire to maintain the executive privilege to protect
20 7 The
confidential communications is central to the Bush Order.
confidential
such
of
protection
Court's
Supreme
communications is stronger than any statutory mandate for
2°8
Where the
disclosure-either under the FOIA or the PRA.
Supreme
the
and
statute provides liberal access to documents,
Court is exceedingly protective of potentially confidential
2 9 by
documents, the Bush Order effectively strikes a balance
adhering both to the PRA and the Supreme Court orders in
210
Nixon v. Administrator of General Services and United States v.
211
Nixon.
"President George W. Bush issued Executive Order No.
13233 to establish neutral procedures for the incumbent and
former Presidents to review documents subject to release and
212
In contrast, the
invoke constitutionally based privileges."
presidential
how
PRA's vague guidelines were silent as to
213 For the first time in its
privilege and the PRA would interact.
history, the PRA needed to be interpreted, and the Bush
Administration, specifically the Office of Legal Counsel, took
time to address the Act's concerns while balancing the executive
privilege. 214 Whelan and others in the Bush Administration
206. See id. at 20.
207. See id. at 479-81 (prepared statement of Todd F. Gaziano, Senior Fellow in
Legal Studies and Director, Center for Legal and Judicial Studies at The Heritage
Foundation).
208. See id. See also supra text accompanying notes 110-115.
209. See Hearings, supra note 3, at 20 (statement of M. Edward Whelan, III,
Acting Assistant Attorney General, Office of Legal Counsel, Dept. of Justice).
210. 433 U.S. 425 (1977). The President's constitutionally based privileges
"survive the President's tenure" and "[u]nless [the President] can give his advisors
some assurance of confidentiality, a President could not expect to receive the full
and frank submissions of facts and opinions upon which effective discharge of his
duties depends." Id. at 552.
211. 418 U.S. 683 (1974).
212. Hearings, supra note 3, at 480 (prepared statement of Todd F. Gaziano,
Senior Fellow in Legal Studies and Director, Center for Legal and Judicial Studies at
The Heritage Foundation).
213. See id. at 20 (statement of M. Edward Whelan, I1,Acting Assistant Attorney
General, Office of Legal Counsel, Dept. of Justice).
214. See id. at 447 (prepared statement of Morton Rosenberg, specialist in
American public law, American Law Division, Congressional Research Service).
The result was the drafting of the Bush Order. See id. at 20 (statement of M. Edward
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drafted the Bush Order as a response to these requests. 215
The Bush Order does not purport to give the incumbent
President any additional rights.2 16 Rather, the Bush Order
specifically mentions that it does not "indicate whether and
under what circumstances a former President should assert or
waive any privilege." 217 The Bush Order clarifies the process
through which PRA requests are honored. 218 During the
November 1, 2001, Press Briefing by Ari Fleischer, 219 questions
arose regarding the Bush Order and the PRA.220 Fleischer's
responses to these questions about the Bush Order specified that
the Administration intended the Bush Order to increase
efficiency in PRA implementation, thereby easing the burden on
those requesting documents.221 More importantly, Fleischer
stated that the Bush Order would begin the process of releasing
documents from the Reagan presidential records, which had
been stalled until implementation language was drafted.222
The government needed the Bush Order to withhold certain
documents that may still contain matters that must be kept
confidential.223 By placing only a temporal limitation on the
release, the Reagan Order failed to address documents that the
former President consents to the release of, but which the
incumbent President deems confidential.224 Fleischer articulated
this potential problem in an example:
There very [well] may be a decision by an administration
that has been out of office for 12 years to release certain
documents. Those documents could still have national
Whelan, III, Acting Assistant Attorney General, Office of Legal Counsel, Dept. of
Justice). Once President Bush took office in January 2001, there were numerous
requests for the Reagan Administration documents. See id. at 447 (prepared
statement of Morton Rosenberg, specialist in American public law, American Law
Division, Congressional Research Service). Whelan never specifically states that the
requests were coming in, although it is apparent from the filing of the Complaint by
the various historical groups that these requests did take place. See id. at 20
(statement of M. Edward Whelan, III, Acting Assistant Attorney General, Office of
Legal Counsel, Dept. of Justice).
215. See id. at 20-21.
216. See id. at 21.
217. Bush Order, supra note 10, § 9.
218. See id.
219. White House Press Secretary.
220. See Press Briefing by Ari Fleischer, supra note 128.
221. See id.
222. See id.
223. See id.
224. See id.
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security implications. A previous administration that is not
currently in power would not be as aware as a current
administration of ongoing national security issues. So that
provides for an ability of a current administration to review
it.2

25

The Bush Order thus takes the mandates of the PRA and
superior,
the
maintaining
while
them
implements
226
constitutionally-based privileges.
The release of Presidential records is not new to the PRA.
Presidents have a history of releasing documents, even those
that have previously been considered confidential. 227 The PRA
merely attempted to codify the patterns of previous Presidents,
and specifically did so in response to the concerns following the
The Bush Administration offered
Nixon presidency. 228
Executive Order 13,233229 as a means to make the difficult-tointerpret elements of the PRA 230 fit with the Act's purpose while
231
remaining constitutionally-sound.
232 in
After the initial Congressional committee hearings
response to the Bush Order Representative Horn introduced
House Bill 4187233 entitled "Presidential Records Act
Representative Horn held further
Amendments of 2002."
hearings before the Subcommittee on Government Efficiency,
Financial Management, and International Relations to discuss
House Bill 4187.234 House Bill 4187 includes a requirement that
225. Press Briefing by Ari Fleischer, supra note 128.
226. See id.
227. See Dorsen and Shattuck, supra note 1, at 2 ("Executive privilege has
proliferated over the decades very much as executive power itself has grown. Early
presidents asserted the privilege infrequently and in narrow circumstances.").
228. See supra notes 46-52. See generally Dorsen and Shattuck, supra note 1.
Although Presidents had previously gifted their papers to the federal government,
the PRA codified this practice. Additionally, following the Nixon presidency there
was much attention paid to the need for oversight of the Office of the President
with regard to potentially incriminating records.
229. See Bush Order, supra note 10.
230. Namely this is a reference to the provisions which relate to the matters
discussed supra relating to the release of presidential records after the expiration of
the 12 year period following their term.
231. See Hearings,supra note 3, at 480-82 (prepared statement of Todd F. Gaziano,
Senior Fellow in Legal Studies and Director, Center for Legal and Judicial Studies at
The Heritage Foundation).
232. See generally Hearings,supra note 3.
at
available
(2002),
Cong.
107th
4187,
233. H.R.
http://thomas.loc.gov/bss/d107/dl07laws.html.
234. Horn introduced the third, and final, hearings as an opportunity to
determine whether House Bill 4187 was the appropriate legislative response to the
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"[t]he Archivist shall not make publicly available a Presidential
record that is subject to a privilege claim asserted by a former
President until the expiration of [a] 20-day period... "235 This
requirement effectively proposed to put an unconstitutional
limit on the President's exercise of executive privilege. 236 Unlike
the Bush Order, which implements the PRA, House Bill 4187
attempts to broaden the reach of the PRA by placing new
restrictions on the President requiring an expedited schedule for
release of documents by the Archivist.237 Additionally, House
Bill 4187 would change the PRA to require that "[u]pon the
expiration of such [twenty-day] period the Archivist shall make
the record publicly available unless otherwise directed by a
court order in an action initiated by the former President." 238 It
is unclear why Representative Horn justified placing such a
burden on the former President when Congress would be in a

Bush Order.
Our earlier hearings fully explored the problems with Executive Order
13233. Today's hearing focuses on potential solutions. Specifically, we
will consider H.R. 4187, a bill that I and several of my colleagues
introduced on April 11, 2002. H.R. 4187 would replace the executive order
with a statutory process for former and incumbent Presidents to review
records prior to their release and assert executive privilege claims, if they
so choose.
Hearings,supra note 3, at 389 (opening statement of Rep. Steve Horn).
235. H.R. 4187 § (c)(1).
236. Todd F. Gaziano, Senior Fellow in Legal Studies and Director of the Center
for Legal and Judicial Studies at The Heritage Foundation (a nonpartisan research
and educational organization) identifies the constitutional problem with the
legislature attempting to place limits on the President's exercise of executive
privilege:
Subsection (c), if it were constitutional, would effectively nullify a former
President's right to assert executive privilege over documents from his
administration. It would convert an executive privilege that is
presumptively valid and can only be overturned by an affirmative court
order into a right to delay the release for twenty days. The President's
opportunity to seek court action does not cure the constitutional defect,
because Congress simply has no power to take an exclusive presidential
power and condition it on the assent of another branch. That is a basic
tenet of separation of powers doctrine. It should be self-evident that a
power which flows from the separation of powers (the executive privilege)
cannot be conditioned on approval from the courts (subsection (c)).
Hearings,supra note 3, at 482 (prepared statement of Todd F. Gaziano).
237. See id. at 484 ("H.R. 4187 does not amend the framework of the PRA that is
within Congress's power, but it is an attempt to modify, condition, and partially
nullify incumbent and former Presidents' constitutional powers. In these respects,
H.R. 4187 would be void even if it were passed.").
238. H.R. 4187 § (c)(2).
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239
better position to afford such expenses.

V.

PROPOSAL

The instant issue is the struggle between the desire for
historians to have access to the documents of former Presidents
240 While the
and the need to maintain presidential privilege.
interests of historians are important to the development of a
national history, 241 executive privilege supercedes such academic
interests. 242 In order to continue the pattern of liberal release of
documents by former Presidents, the PRA needs to have
243 The Bush Order effectively
guidelines for its implementation.
sets precedent for the future distribution of presidential records

under the PRA.244
The PRA was the result of a Congressional attempt to codify
the traditional action of Presidents gifting their records to the
People of the United States. 245 This attempt was bold, and the
ownership of these records is now more important than ever as
246
The PRA falls
historians seek to learn more about the past.
short, however, in its lack of clarity about the release of the
239. See Hearings, supra note 3 at 482 (prepared statement of Todd F. Gaziano,
Senior Fellow in Legal Studies and Director, Center for Legal and Judicial Studies at
The Heritage Foundation).
Subsection (c) may be predicated on the belief that the former President is
in a better position to bear the cost of litigation than the requester. There
are four logical responses to this notion. First, it is not true with regard to
large media corporations. Second, Congress could subsidize such
litigation, but since it failed to do so, it makes more sense for the person
who seeks to profit by such information to bear the cost of litigationregardless of relative wealth. Third, the former President already must
devote substantial amounts of time to reviewing burdensome document
requests for potentially privileged documents; he should not also have to
bear the burden of initiating litigation when a requester might be satisfied
with the balance of what is released. Fourth, and most important, a policy
concern-no matter how well founded-cannot trump a constitutional
right.
Id. at 482.
240. See Complaint, supra note 130.
241. See id.
242. See Bush Order, supra note 10. See also Reagan Order, supra note 14;
Hearings,supra note 3.
243. See Bush Order, supra note 10.
244. See id. See also Hearings,supra note 3, at 480-82 (prepared statement of Todd
F. Gaziano, Senior Fellow in Legal Studies and Director, Center for Legal and
Judicial Studies at The Heritage Foundation).
245. See Hearings, supra note 3, at 479-80. See also supra notes 77-89 and
accompanying text.
246. See Complaint, supra note 130.
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confidential records of former Presidents. 247 Perhaps twentyfive years ago, when Congress passed the PRA, it did not foresee
the implementation of the Act beyond the question of
ownership. However, legislative history suggests otherwise. 248
As President Reagan left office and issued the Reagan Order,
Congress chose not to change the PRA to delineate more specific
procedures for the release of documents. Thus, the PRA left
open to the political process the determination of how executive
privilege would cooperate with the Act, resulting in the release
of Presidential records. 249
The fact that the Bush and Reagan Orders were able to
modify the implementation of the PRA illustrates the weak
nature of the Act. It also shows that the Act could not stretch
beyond ownership without infringing upon the executive
privilege.
Therefore, the Act left the responsibility for
interpretation of the PRA to the Executive, 250 and any release of
documents constitutes a permissive waiver of executive
privilege. 251 The Bush Order organizes this waiver into a system
of requests by the Archivist to the former President and
eventually leaves authority with the incumbent President to
invoke executive privilege. 25 2 The Bush Order thus strengthens
the constitutionality of the PRA.253
Implementation of the PRA beyond the definition of who
owns presidential documents, still must fall within the privilege
requirements that the Supreme Court has established. 254 The
Bush Order does exactly this. Even without the PRA, history
247, See Reagan Order, supra note 14; Bush Order, supra note 10.
248. See Hearings,supra note 3, at 11-12 (prepared statement of John W. Carlin,
Archivist of the United States).
249. See id. at 479-81 (prepared statement of Todd F. Gaziano, Senior Fellow in
Legal Studies and Director, Center for Legal and Judicial Studies at The Heritage
Foundation).
250. See id. at 68-71 (prepared statement of Peter M. Shane, professor, University
of Pittsburgh and Carnegie Mellon University).
251. See id.
252. See Bush Order, supra note 10. See also Hearings, supra note 3, at 484 ("Thus,
[the Bush Order] contains the President's public statement regarding how he will
exercise his constitutional power (and respect the constitutional power of former
Presidents) within the framework of the PRA. It also contains his instructions to the
Archivist in such matters.").
253. See Hearings,supra note 3, at 480 ("The bulk of [the Bush Order] is not only
lawful and prudent, but it is-with minor exceptions -practically the only way to
implement the PRA consistent with the incumbent and former Presidents'
constitutional obligations.").
254. See supra Part II.C.1.
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proves that the men who have served thus far as President of the
United States have opened their presidencies to historians by
gifting their records to the People.255 Congressional opposition
to the Bush Order will not serve the goal of those who profess to
be against the order. 256 Representative Horn, the Congressman
who convened the hearings on the Bush Order and introduced
House Bill 4187, retired from Congress in January 2003.257
Congress never passed the legislation that would have
modified the PRA and invalidated the Bush Order. 258 The Bush
Administration ultimately released most of the documents at the
heart of the debate about the PRA, 259 further proving that in due
time presidential documents make their way into the hands of
historians. Although it is important for Congress to play a role
in the release of presidential records, it is equally important to
allow the Executive to implement the PRA. There is nothing
255. See supra note 3.
256. See supra Part II.D.
257. Due to significant changes in the make-up of the Congressional District
which he represents, Representative Horn announced his retirement in September
2001:
Just days after a CA Assembly committee released a redistricting plan that
would erase LB's 38th Congressional district (moving it to near Fresno),
put most of L[ong] B[each] in the same Congressional district as Carson
and Compton (now led by a Democrat) and split E[ast] L[ong] B[each], the
man who represented much of LB, Lakewood and southeast L.A. County
in the U.S. House of Representatives since 1992 has announced he will
leave Congress at the end of his current term.
LB Cong. Steve Horn To Retire At End of Current Term Jan. 2003, LBREPORT.COM, at
2001).
4,
(Sept.
http://www.lbreport.com/news/sep01/hornreti.htm
Representative Horn thus knew that he only had one term in which to take action
on the Bush Order as he announced his retirement before commencing hearings on
the proposed changes to the PRA.
258. After the close of the 107th Congress, the legislation pending needs to be
reintroduced. With the absence of Representative Horn, the primary sponsor of
House Bill 4187 and the bill's author, it is unlikely that the legislation will be
introduced again in a future Congress. Furthermore, the release of the Reagan
documents makes revision of the PRA, once again, unnecessary as there is no
pressing dispute.
259. The NARA released nearly 60,000 pages of documents on March 15, 2002,
and sent them to the Ronald Reagan Presidential Library. Historians now have the
opportunity to access the records pursuant to the procedures of the library. An
inventory of the records is available on the internet. See Ronald Reagan Library
at
2002,
15,
March
on
Opened
Material
P5
of
Inventories
Additional documents were
http://www.reagan.utexas.edu/p5inv031502.htm.
released on July 19, 2002. See Ronald Reagan Library Inventories of P5 Material
Opened on July 19, 2002, at http://www.reagan.utexas.edu/p5inv071902.htm. The
Ronald Reagan Presidential Library announces the release of the documents. See
Official Web Site of the Ronald Reagan Presidential Library at
http://www.reagan.utexas.edu (last visited April 1, 2003).
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"simple" about American democracy when it comes to the
interplay between the three branches. However, the PRA is a
perfect example of how to reach the delicate balance of
congressional legislation, Supreme Court rulings, and Executive
Orders from the President.
VI. CONCLUSION

The Bush Order is, as its title suggests, a guide for "Further
Implementation of the Presidential Records Act." 260
The
problem, however, is that the PRA did little other than turn over
ownership of presidential records to the federal government. 261
Due to superceding constitutionally based privileges, the PRA
could not mandate release of all documents including
confidential communications. 262 Even the FOIA provisions
could not mandate that action. The Reagan Order, followed by
the Bush Order, made the provisions of the PRA operate within
the rights afforded the President under executive privilege. 263
Dissent with the Bush Order charging that it is in opposition to
the PRA, does not pass muster as the Order relies upon
constitutional merits rather than the statutorily-based merits of
the Act. 264
Although Congress has the option of taking on the
challenge of balancing the two important interests of executive
privilege and access to historical information, the Bush Order is
a strong solution to the problems of the PRA.265 Access to
information is a vital part of understanding our past and the role
of historians as we embark on the future cannot be ignored.
Presidents should be encouraged to be candid with the release of
their documents, but further legislation is not the best way to
implement that goal. The Bush Order strikes a delicate balance
in the need for implementing the PRA and securing history-only
the future will test its effectiveness.

260. Bush Order, supra note 10.
261. See supra Part IV.
262. See supra Part V.
263. See Reagan Order, supra note 14. See also supra Part III.B.
264. See Bush Order, supra note 10. See also supra Part III.C.

265. See supra Part V.

